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Fourth Amendment Review
2021
Ekow N. Yankah*

When it comes to policing, the U.S. Supreme Court too often
plays the role of the garish sun.1 Scholars counsel that policing is the
quintessential local activity, often repeating that the United States has
up to 18,000 local police forces, and if one wants to change policing, the
place to look is your police chief, sheriff, or mayor.2 Yet despite our own
warnings, we cannot help staring towards that Washingtonian marbled
temple, to divine the shape of policing to come. If the Supreme Court
cannot readily modify policing in each city and hamlet, it is unique in its
ability to establish binding nationwide Fourth Amendment rulings and
set minimum guarantees on the limits of policing power. And though we
know it to be ridiculous, we seek some magic bullet solution to cure the
turmoil of contemporary debates and protests surrounding policing.
If our impulse is to look to the Court for answers, this Term
revealed no revolutionary solution but rather the dim outlines of our
own reflection. As Court watchers occasionally remind, Supreme Court
justices read The New York Times too. Whatever their newspaper of choice,
this Term’s policing cases, if not monumental in nature, reflect a Court
that seems affected by the national reckoning with police power and
police brutality. To be sure, there is no grand movement or iconic case
engaging with the numerous brutal police killings, particularly of Black
men. Direct engagement is seen only in innuendo, in dissenting opinions
at that. But one senses a Court touched by the nationwide call to attend
to the way policing interacts with policed communities.
* Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law.
1
See William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet act 3, sc. 2 (“Give me my Romeo. And when I
shall die,/Take him and cut him out in little stars,/And he will make the face of heaven
so fine/That all the world will be in love with night/And pay no worship to the garish
sun.”).
2
Leandra Bernstein, America has 18,000 Police Agencies, No National Standards; Experts Say
That is a Problem, WJLA (June 9, 2020).

41

ACS Supreme Court Review
Perhaps I am reading a Supreme Court Rorschach test, seeing the
things in the cases that matter most to me. After all, one of the three
major Fourth Amendment rulings of this Term actually expanded the
power of the police, though in a particularized context, and the other
two offered only mild constraints on policing powers. A politicized,
abolitionist Court or Fourth Amendment revolution this is not.
Yet, against a generation of largely (if not universally) expanding
policing power, one can search this Term’s cases for a bulwark against
further free reign to police in giving chase and using violence to seize
ordinary citizens.
I. United States v. Cooley: Who Gets to Police Whom?
Begin first with the counter example. On June 1, 2021, the Supreme
Court decided United States v. Cooley.3 The defendant, James Cooley, was
in the Crow Indian Reservation in Montana when tribal police officer
James Saylor noticed his truck idling by the side of the road. While
questioning Cooley to determine if he needed help, Saylor noticed
Cooley’s bloodshot eyes and suspected Cooley was intoxicated. More
pressingly, Saylor saw two semiautomatic rifles in Cooley’s front seat.
The situation reportedly grew tense; Saylor drew his weapon, detained
Cooley, and called for backup.4 During this process, Saylor also saw
drug paraphernalia, plastic bags, and a glass pipe associated with
methamphetamine use. The drug paraphernalia was seized as it was in
plain sight, and Cooley was questioned by federal and local officers and
eventually indicted on gun and drug charges.5
Even given the tense arrest, the surface facts of the arrest hardly
seem remarkable. An intoxicated driver with weapons and drugs is
hardly unique. But what made this case sufficiently important for the
Supreme Court was the location of the arrest and the people involved.
Cooley, a non-Indian, was traveling on Indian land when he was arrested
by Officer Saylor, a tribal police officer, bringing to the fore a unique facet
of American policing law regarding racial minorities.6

United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021).
Id. at 1639; Elizabeth Reese, Affirmation of Inherent Tribal Power to Police Blurs Civil and
Criminal Indian Law Tests, SCOTUSblog (June 7, 2021).
5
Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1639.
6
See id.
3
4
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Indian tribal law occupies a unique space in American law.
Obviously, Indian nations were once independent. After the colonization,
conquering, and genocide of the Native Americans, the majority of
Native Americans were packed into reservation lands. Thus, Indian
nations became a hybrid creature: domestic land that was granted wide
sovereign powers to govern its own affairs but with those powers limited
and superseded by the laws of the United States. This has resulted in
a complex and understudied interplay of federal, state, and tribal law.7
Particularly, pertaining to criminal law and policing, the right of Indian
territories to enforce their own laws and police their own customs has
posed an enduring question.8
Picking up on earlier law that disabled tribal authorities from
regulating hunting and fishing, Cooley argued that as a non-Indian,
tribal officer Saylor lacked the authority to search and detain him. Rather,
he argued that once tribal officers realized he was a non-Indian, they
were obligated to release him unless they had actively witnessed him
committing a crime. Cooley further argued tribal officers should be
required to ask a detainee whether they are Indian and only authorized
to detain those who answer yes (or presumably were otherwise
reasonably ascertained as Indian).
The Supreme Court, succinctly reviewing the retained inherent
sovereign authorities of tribal powers, unanimously rejected Cooley’s
argument. The Court was unpersuaded that tribal powers derived
merely from the power to keep non-Indians from entering reservation

 or more on this history and the role the U.S. Supreme Court has played, see Matthew
F
L.M. Fletcher, A Short History of Indian Law in the Supreme Court, Am. Bar Assoc. (Oct. 1,
2014).
8
A famous example, illustrating the interplay between state employment law, criminal
law, and tribal law and norms is Employment Div. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
There, two defendants, Smith and Black, were counselors at a private drug rehabilitation
clinic. They were fired for ingesting peyote, a powerful and outlawed hallucinogen,
which they took as a part of a religious ceremony at the Native American Church. They
were both subsequently denied unemployment benefits. Both sued, arguing that denying
them benefits premised on work-related misconduct violated their rights under the Free
Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution. After a circuitous route, the Court eventually
found that though employment benefits could not be conditioned on one surrendering
their religious practices, one could be legally sanctioned for behavior in violation of
justifiable criminal laws. Id. at 779–80.
7
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lands.9 Instead, the Court determined the case was straight-forwardly
settled by its prior precedent. In earlier language, the Supreme
Court held that whatever the restraints on their legal authority, tribal
authorities “retain[ed] inherent power to exercise civil authority over
the conduct of non-Indians . . . within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”10 The Court thought it
obvious that detaining persons, Indian or not, suspected of intoxicated
driving fit this reasoning “like a glove.”11
Ultimately then, the Supreme Court expanded the power of the
police throughout bounded regions of the country. It firmly dismissed
arguments that the police establish the ethnic identity of a person before
asserting authority.12 Given the crime at bar, an intoxicated man with
semi-automatic weapons, it would have been surprising, circuit court
ruling notwithstanding, had the Court ruled otherwise. It is natural to
read this outcome as the Court continuing to expand police power.
But another reading of this case admits interesting nuance.
Obviously, Supreme Court cases typically eschew any explicit allegiances
to political positions or stakes in sweeping controversies. But among the
sociological, legal, and everyday political accusations in modern policing
has been the charge that minority communities are both overpoliced
and under-protected. This phrase captures the phenomenon that
minority communities are often the focus of concentrated policing, yet
that policing is often not viewed as serving the interests of the patrolled
community. At its heart, it describes the all-too-common feeling in many
communities that the police are something like an occupying army,
serving wealthy, powerful, and often White constituencies elsewhere.
 ooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1643. As mentioned, the interplay between inherent tribal authority
C
and the powers of the United States and questions as to whether Cooley presented an
opportunity for the Court to trim back those powers is complex and beyond both my
expertise and purpose. See Reese, supra note 4, for an excellent starting point for this wider
inquiry.
10
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
11
Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1643.
12
Dismissing such invitations for the police to cabin their authority by first seeking a
sort of jurisdictional authority is independently interesting. It recalls the analogous
invitation for police to inform citizens of their right to withhold consent when asking to
conduct searches. A generation ago, the Supreme Court rejected that requirement as well.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
9
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While the Supreme Court denies it is a player in this political debate,
there is a clear sense in which Cooley puts this question unavoidably in
front of the Court. Ultimately, Cooley asks not just what is policed but
who is permitted to do that policing. More specifically, Cooley asks if a
minority community is permitted to take control of its own policing, by
its own members, for its own good, even to the point of enforcing laws
on non-Indians. This, of course, does not mean that tribal policing is
unproblematic; policing in Black-majority cities by Black policemen, as
an analogy, does not magically cure the racial tensions in policing.13 Still,
it is hard to ignore that the Court’s ruling explicitly rejects a position that
would have further neutered a semi-sovereign nation, housing arguably
America’s most vulnerable racial minority, from policing its own streets
from non-Indians. In this sense, the result of Cooley was not only to
expand policing power but also to place greater control of that policing
in the hands of the racial minority being policed.
II. Lange v. California: What Are the Limits to Hot Pursuit?
Perhaps the most consequential of this Term’s policing cases may
be the one with the most seemingly innocuous facts, Lange v. California.14
Indeed, it is precisely because the facts are so quotidian that the ruling
holds so much meaning. In October 2016, Arthur Lange was “rolling
down the street,”15 to wit, Lange was driving while playing loud music,
with his windows down and honking his horn. Surprising perhaps no
one but himself, Lange caught the attention of a California highway
patrol officer who, believing Lange to be in violation of at least California
misdemeanor noise statutes, signaled for Lange to pull over.16
By then Lange, who claimed to not have seen the flashing lights, was
only one hundred feet from his home and so pulled into his garage. The
officer followed Lange into his garage to question him. Believing Lange
to be drunk, the officer put Lange through a field sobriety test. Lange did

See James Forman Jr., Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black America
(2017).
14
Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct. 2011 (2021).
15
Snoop Dogg, Gin and Juice (Death Row/Interscope Records, Inc. 1993). This represents
a vague attempt to be whimsical. I am sad to inform the reader your author is not
particularly “hip.” And, of course, drunk driving is not to be taken lightly. Sigh…
16
Lange, 141 S. Ct. at 2013.
13
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not pass, surely because his blood-alcohol level was later revealed to be
over three times the legal limit.
The legal issue at the center of the case focused on the moment
the officer entered Lange’s garage. There may be no more repeated
incantation in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence than the declaration
that the home is the heart of the protection against (literally)
unwarranted police intrusion.17 Famously, even when the police have
probable cause to believe a murder suspect is home, with lights on and
music playing, police entry without a warrant is unauthorized and may
lead to suppression of any recovered evidence.18
To the dismay of generations of criminal-procedure students, though
the home is held up as sacrosanct, there are myriad exceptions to the
warrant requirement. The most prominent among these are grouped into
“exigent circumstances.” The archetypal exigent circumstance, at issue
in Lange, is “hot pursuit.”19 For obvious reasons, if police are chasing a
felony suspect, they are not obligated to stop helplessly at the door of
the home. They may enter the home to capture the suspect so long as
they were in hot pursuit. Any other rule risks turning policing into an
elaborate game of tag, with one’s home acting as “base.”
Were Lange suspected of a felony, the legal analysis would have been
well-settled by precedent. Whether or not the facts on the ground show
the police are in hot pursuit will often be controversial. In one case cited
by the Court, police pulled up to a home, guns drawn, finding a female
suspect with one foot in and one foot out of her home.20 Whether her
fleeing into her home in fact constituted hot pursuit was hotly debated.
But if the police are in hot pursuit of a felon, the law is clear they may
enter a home without a warrant. Remember, however, that when
California Highway Patrol followed Lange into his home, the officer
only had evidence that Lange had violated a misdemeanor, the willful
failure to comply with a lawful order by a police officer (and perhaps a
noise infraction).
I ntrusions are governed by the warrant requirement when they are fundamentally related
to policing and crime control. Non-crime-control police acts, such as a welfare check, are
considered community caretaking and are not governed by the warrant requirement.
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
18
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
19
Lange, 141 S. Ct. at 2016.
20
U.S. v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
17

46

Fourth Amendment Review 2021
Given the constant invocations about the sanctity of the home, one
might think the legal question would turn on whether a police officer
can ever enter a home in hot pursuit of a misdemeanor offense. But
that would be to sorely misread the vast default permissiveness of our
national policing culture. Rather, the legal question put to the Court
was whether the pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect always,
i.e., categorically, permits the police to follow a suspect into a home.
Put slightly differently, does hot pursuit by itself create an exigent
circumstance, waiving the warrant requirement?
The Court unanimously rejected a categorical rule that would allow
a categorical hot pursuit exigency in misdemeanor cases.21 But the
unanimous vote both belied a fairly modest view of the limitations on
police and hid rather sharp disagreements between the majority and a
separate opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito
that was a dissent in everything but name.
Even in rejecting the over-expansive proposal allowing warrantless
entry in pursuit of misdemeanants, the majority made clear that a
case-by-case analysis would often permit home entry when chasing
a person who did not yield to police commands.22 Police often must
make quick decisions in rapidly changing and charged circumstances.
A circumstance that initially appears to be a relatively minor legal issue
may reveal unanticipated dangers. Additionally, the fact that a suspect
fled may obviously charge the situation further. Hot pursuit of a suspect,
whether a misdemeanant or not, may give rise to other classic exigencies,
such as fear of harm to officers or bystanders, or the destruction of
evidence. In short, there may be many reasons for the police to treat
hot pursuit of a misdemeanant as an exigency requiring them to enter
a home.
Nonetheless, the Court balked at a categorical permission to ignore
the warrant requirement in what are, after all, minor infractions. First,
the Court relied on a little-referenced thread in its Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence that where there was no immediate danger, the severity
of a crime has some effect on the license given police to execute a
warrantless search. The supporting case, Welsh v. Wisconsin,23 bore at
Lange, 141 S. Ct. at 2016.
Id. at 2021–22.
23
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
21
22
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least a passing resemblance to the facts of Lange. In Welsh, police officers,
responding to a call about a drunk driver, tracked Welsh to his nearby
home and entered without a warrant to investigate. In that case, the
Supreme Court ruled that the police could not enter the home as an
exigency for such a minor offense.24
Welsh differed in important ways from the facts of Lange. Most
obviously, Welsh was already home in bed, thus removing the critical
facet of hot pursuit.25 But the point remained that the lack of urgency was
a reason to restrain police from entering a home without a warrant. The
same reasoning applied here. If true that a misdemeanor does not always
rule out an urgent situation, surely the opposite conclusion, that any
flight from any minor offense should permit an unrestricted police chase
no matter the underlying issue, borders on the unbelievable. This insight
was highlighted in the majority’s historical survey of Fourth Amendment
law, exploring the starkly different powers police had to enter a home in
pursuit of a suspected felon versus those suspected of minor infractions.
Ultimately, the majority ruled that police entry into a home in hot pursuit
of a misdemeanant must turn on the totality of the circumstances.
The decision produced brief concurring opinions, including from
Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Thomas’s double-pointed concurrence
first contented that any rule prohibiting police from entering a home
must carve out an exception for officers pursuing anyone fleeing
even minor violence or breach of the peace. Secondly, Justice Thomas
continued his long-held insistence that even if police violated the newly
announced rule against misdemeanor home entries, the classic Fourth
Amendment remedy of suppressing evidence should not be assumed.26
While the precise legal remedy for a violation would not seem
critical in deciding the core of the case, Justice Thomas’s shot across the

Id. at 740–41. To be sure, the Court’s view of how the weightiness of an offense effects
police authorization under the Fourth Amendment is at least unclear. In contrast to its
reasoning in Welsh and Lange, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that police arrests in
the case of minor, “non-arrestable” crimes are Fourth Amendment violations. Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). More recently, the suggestion that police power
to electronically follow suspects by, for example, monitoring their cars for weeks on end,
might turn on the seriousness of the suspected crime was dismissed as unheard of in its
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
25
Compare Lange, 141 S. Ct. at 2016, with Welsh, 466 U.S. at 740.
26
Lange, 141 S. Ct. at 2026–28 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgement).
24

48

Fourth Amendment Review 2021
bow is much more than a theoretical skirmish about how best to enforce
an agreed-upon rule. Legal scholars have long recognized the difficulty
of enforcing Fourth Amendment restrictions and further translating
those restrictions into policing culture. As anyone who follows the
pitched political battle surrounding qualified immunity in cases of police
misconduct can attest, civil damages and other alternatives have shown
little impact in altering policing behavior. To be frank, police behavior is
often hard to alter even with the “sanction” of excluding evidence. Thus,
Justice Thomas’s insistence that the exclusionary rule ought not to be
applied to curtail police violations of this rule threatens to neuter the rule
at inception.
If Justice Thomas’s additions would fatally weaken Lange’s holding,
Chief Justice Roberts’s separate opinion was all but aghast that the rule
would apply except in the rarest of cases. In Chief Justice Roberts’s
view, Supreme Court precedent has already established that hot pursuit,
without regard to the underlying offense, established the exigency
required for warrantless home entry. He further blasted the majority’s
ruling as both dangerous for police officers and encouraging suspects to
flee rather than obey police orders. In Chief Justice Roberts’s view, the
majority opinion does so only to impose the time-consuming formality
of securing a warrant. Lastly, he warns that the majority ruling imposes
uncertainty onto police officers who often do not (or cannot) know
whether the facts in front of them amount to a misdemeanor or felony.
The only remaining question was whether Lange’s case was one of the
rare instances in which warrantless entry ought not to be allowed despite
the exigent circumstances.27
A one hundred-yard police “chase” of an obnoxious drunk, booming
loud music, resulting in a unanimous opinion, hardly seems worthy
of great note. But it is precisely the innocuous contours of the case that
lend it such weight. While spectacular cases of violent felonies most
readily capture our imagination, the overwhelming majority of police
work concerns anything but. Police officers spend their days engaged in
ordinary order maintenance: unruly drunken behavior, heated tempers
and sudden fights, overly loud music, drug use, and vandalism. In
short, the misdemeanor hallmarks of Lange are precisely the daily

27

Id. at 2028–37 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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grist of policing work.28 That is not yet to even mention the seemingly
endlessly proliferating criminal laws, infractions, and vehicle regulations
that mean that police have nearly limitless power to find misdemeanor
criminal violations of any suspects they wish to investigate.
Further, it would be willfully blind to ignore the obvious racial
implications of the ruling in Lange. If Lange’s behavior was obviously
attention grabbing, it remains true that generations of AfricanAmericans, myself included, have internalized the unchecked power of
the police to stop you for the crime of “driving while Black.”29 Nor does
racist harassment disappear once Black and Hispanic citizens exit their
cars. The recent nationwide political fights and lawsuits surrounding
institutionalized “stop and frisk” regimes revealed stunning racially
disproportionate frisks. There is every reason to believe that a rule
categorically permitting police to chase citizens into homes in pursuit of
any infraction, no matter how minor, would have the same effects.
In the real world, police choose whom to police at least as often as
they are compelled to intervene. A categorical permission to pursue any
misdemeanant would give police unchecked power to chase anyone,
anywhere, without limitation. Chief Justice Roberts addresses this
glaring issue only in passing, noting that earlier precedent prohibits
police from purposefully generating an exigent circumstance in order to
gain access to homes. But the cases mentioned in the majority opinion
tell a very different story. In Wardlow v. Illinois a caravan of police, known
as a “jump out” squad, descended on a high drug-trafficking area,
scattering a number of people, and starting a police chase.30 Similarly,
in California v. Hodari D. police officers sent four or five panicked youths
fleeing.31 Nor should one be misled because those famous cases involved
people ultimately captured with contraband. It is one of the standing
truths about criminal procedure that highly visible cases typically
involve the guilty. Those facing jail time are the ones with the incentive
to litigate cases to the Supreme Court. As the stop-and-frisk litigation
Issa Kolher-Hausmann, Misdemeanorland: Criminal Courts and Social Control in the Age
of Broken Windows Policing (2018).
29
Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 956, 957 n.1 (1999); Charles R. Epp, Steven Maynard-Moody & Donald P.
Haider-Markel, Pulled Over: How Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship (2014).
30
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121–24 (2000).
31
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 622 (1991).
28

50

Fourth Amendment Review 2021
reminds, countless instances of other innocents chased by the police
typically disappear without record.
And as the majority’s opinion illustrates, it takes little imagination
to multiply the examples endlessly. People with mental disabilities may
quickly retreat from the police. A teenager, driving without headlights,
faced with police lights, continues a couple blocks home to hide in the
bathroom. More charged are the words of caution in earlier cases, which
remind that ordinary, law-abiding citizens may have sound reason to flee
in the face of police activity because they fear trouble or violence. Indeed,
as the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently recognized, Black
men in particular, well aware of the racial inequities in policing, may
have particular reasons to avoid or run from the police.32
No thoughtful observer need be naïve. Police may have reason to
believe people fleeing from what seem like small crimes may create the
urgency that requires police to follow them into their homes. But even
when faced with more pressing and dangerous situations in the past,
including authorization for no-knock warrants in narcotics busts, the
Supreme Court has prohibited categorically authorizing police power.33
So too, the Court here rightfully rejected an unfettered license for
police to chase any teenager playing music too loud through streets,
hedges, and into their home, to enforce a law no matter how minor the
infraction. Such headlong chases too often turn minor incidents into
adrenaline-fueled situations, where the slightest misunderstandings result
in fatal police violence. One hardly needs a litany to recall the number
of nationally searing police killings that resulted from the enforcement
of minor infractions: from Walter Scott’s murder over a non-functioning
taillight to Eric Garner’s killing over the sale of loose cigarettes.34 As
the Supreme Court realized decades ago, capturing lawbreakers is an
important civic project but not at any cost.35 Even if Lange did not frame
a situation as serious as police use of deadly force, these cases remind us
both that deadly force in police chases is an ever-present danger and that
not every minor infraction must be pursued no matter the cost.
Commonwealth v. Jimmy Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342–43 (Mass. 2016).
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.3 (1997) (refusing to adopt a categorical rule).
34
George Floyd: Timeline of Black Deaths and Protests, BBC News (Apr. 22, 2021).
35
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that a Tennessee statute authorizing
the use of deadly force against an unarmed, non-dangerous fleeing suspect is
unconstitutional).
32
33
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III. Torres v. Madrid: Is an Unsuccessful Seizure Still a Seizure?
If unglamorous Lange is most likely to affect daily lives across the
country, it is Torres v. Madrid that reminds of the cases of police violence
that stop the nation in its tracks.36 Torres presents another painful story
of police officers, claims of mortal danger, and a hail of bullets hitting
an unsuspecting victim. Like so many highly visible police shootings
over the past years, the case is ultimately about a citizen accusing the
police of using unjustified deadly violence, seeking accountability
and compensation as against police insistence that their actions were
justified. Though Torres lacks nationwide recognition because it is
unaccompanied by the now-too-common searing video, the Court surely
could not consider the case without being caught in the shadow of too
many well-known deaths at the hands of police and nationwide protests
demanding greater scrutiny of police violence.
On a mid-July morning in 2014, four New Mexico State Police
officers arrived at an Albuquerque apartment complex to serve an
arrest warrant on a female, white-collar suspect also suspected of drug
trafficking and murder. According to the plaintiff, Roxanne Torres,
and hotly contested by police defendants Janice Madrid and Richard
Williamson, the officers spotted Torres speaking to a companion and
understood she was not the target of the warrant. Torres’s companion
left and she, at the time suffering from drug-withdrawal symptoms,
got into her car to do the same. As the officers approached her, Torres
testified that she did not see their clothing identifying them as police but
only noticed their guns. Fearing the worst, she fled a potential carjacking.
Despite not being in the way of her vehicle, the officers reacted by
opening fire on Torres, firing thirteen bullets, hitting her twice in the
back and paralyzing her left arm. Torres managed to steer the car
one-handed until she left the complex, asked a bystander to report an
attempted carjacking, and then stole another car and drove over an
hour to a hospital in a neighboring town. That hospital then airlifted
her back to Albuquerque for medical treatment, where she was arrested
the next day.37
After pleading guilty to a slew of crimes pertaining to assaulting
the police and stealing the car, Torres turned around and sued the police
36
37

Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989 (2021).
Id. at 993–94
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officers for using excessive force to “seize her,” that is, for shooting her.
Thus, in order to recover damages for sustaining gunshot wounds, Torres
now had to prove that the shooting was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. One might think that question was hard enough, but the
facts of the case focused the Supreme Court on an even more nuanced
preliminary question. Given that Torres was shot as she fled the police,
before Torres could prove the police opening fire was an unreasonable
seizing by gunfire, the Court had to answer whether a suspect that
escaped the hold of the police after being shot had been “seized” at all!
That is, if Torres’s successful (temporary) evasion, with two bullets in her
back, meant she had not been seized, then there could be no claim for
excessive force in seizing her.38
For readers unfamiliar with Fourth Amendment doctrine, there is
something awkward, even off-putting about this Fourth Amendment
language and logic. The text of the Fourth Amendment, written long
before armed police were a regular civic feature, only secures people
against unreasonable searches or seizures.39 Thus, rather than simply
discussing whether what the police did was right or necessary, Fourth
Amendment doctrine forces us into describing police shootings as
seizures and asks if the seizure was “reasonable.” It is bad enough such
language forces us to describe death in antiseptic language. It can feel
like desecration to speak of Derek Chauvin or Timothy Loehmann as
having illegally “seized” George Floyd or Tamir Rice. But in Torres, the
Fourth Amendment language did not simply plague our language, it
generated a perplexing legal issue where none would otherwise exist.
Because we must determine if you were “seized,” our natural focus is
shifted from the morality of the police opening fire or the broader ethical
culture of our police departments to the odd question of whether Fourth
Amendment rights are violated if one manages to crawl or drive away.

38
39

Id. at 994.
U.S. Const. amend IV (protecting the “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures”).
Actually, the text indicates that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated and no warrant shall issue without probable cause. Please do not
ask me about the relationship between the reasonableness requirement and the warrant
requirement in the Fourth Amendment. I’m begging you. We will be here all night. It
is . . . shall we say, controversial.
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The Supreme Court has trod this ground before. Indeed, the majority
opinion asserted that Torres was largely decided by earlier precedent
in California v. Hodari D.40 As mentioned earlier, Hodari D. involved
police officers converging on a suspected drug-trafficking area, sending
young men running. As officers gave chase, one suspect, Hodari D.,
threw a small rock out of his hand, which turned out to be crack cocaine.
Hodari D. argued the drugs should be suppressed because at the time
the chase began, the police lacked probable cause to seize him. If the
police assertion of authority were considered an arrest, then Hodari D.
was unlawfully seized when the police yelled “Stop!” and gave chase.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion penned by conservative icon Justice
Antonin Scalia, rejected the argument. Rather, the Hodari D. Court
insisted that seizure did not occur until the police applied physical force
to bring a person or thing under their control. A seizure occurred when
the police applied physical force or the suspect submitted to police
authority. Thus, Hodari D. was not seized, the Court concluded, until he
was tackled.41
Applying that logic to the facts of Torres, the majority insists, made
for an easy ruling. One is seized in a single moment, the Court opined,
even if the seizure is not permanent and one escapes. That single
moment is when force is applied. Thus, Torres was seized the moment
she was shot. Distilled into a holding, the Court held that the use of force
with the intent to restrain constituted a seizure. Further, the majority
stressed the importance of a bright-line rule to govern police officers in
the field.42
Though the Torres majority confidently asserted the case was neatly
resolved by precedent, as lawyers are keenly aware, precedent is only as
valuable as the next Supreme Court decides. Thus, the majority insisted
on supporting the ruling on independent grounds as well. Specifically,
the majority marshalled broad historical examples illustrating that at the
founding, an official’s application of force, even if just a touch, which
revealed an intent to seize was considered an arrest. The Court recalled
historical examples of officials reaching into windows and executing
arrests with a touch. In the most quizzical or charming example,
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
Id. at 622–26
42
Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 1002–03 (citing Hodari D., 399 U.S. at 626).
40
41
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depending on one’s taste, a “serjeant-at-mace” executed an arrest of
an English noblewoman by theatrically touching her with a mace and
proclaiming, “we arrest you, madam.”43
Such genteel considerations are a far cry from having two bullets rip
into your back; a conversation focused on antique methods of arresting
noblewomen would border on obscene if it were not necessitated by
the originalist preoccupation of much of the current Court. A detour
through the debate about the persuasiveness of originalism would derail
our review. But what is clear is that originalism, the view that what the
writers of the Constitution wrote or referenced in their legal concepts
fixes a special meaning on our modern-day constitutional rights, holds
sway over much of a (conservative) wing of this Court. By grounding
their reading in colonial-era understandings of arrest and highlighting
that their decision fit with Hodari D., penned by originalist icon Justice
Scalia, the majority offered a sort of jurisprudential olive branch to
skeptical originalists.
The dissent was having none of it. A blistering dissent, written
by Justice Neil Gorsuch, entirely rejects the majority’s originalist
interpretation, pointing out that the cases cited were largely from obscure
colonial debt-collection practices. Because debt collectors could not enter
a home unless they first laid hands on their quarry, there was apparently
a strange practice of hiding about windows to touch someone in order
to then storm their home. Accusing the majority of wandering through
legal fields and history to cobble together a “pastiche” justification, the
dissent rejects this peculiar colonial game of debt-collector tag as an
analogy to modern police practices.44 The dissent argued simply that if a
suspect is not brought under police control, it is impossible to find that
they have been seized.45
To what end would the majority engage in this accused chicanery?
For that matter, why engage in this rather peculiar debate about whether
Torres was unlawfully seized, by the lights of colonial administrators,
in the first place? Surely, police shooting and hitting someone who
subsequently escapes is not so common as to plague our jurisprudence?
Id. at 995–98 (quoting Countess of Rutland’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 332, 336 (Star Chamber
1605)).
44
Id. at 1010–11, 14 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
45
Id. at 1015–17.
43
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The dissent’s clearly stated accusation reminds us of what is really at
stake and its centrality in contemporary conversations around policing.
Remember that determining whether Torres was unreasonably seized
was critical in determining whether she may sue the police for using
unreasonable force. Ultimately, the Court’s stunted language framed a
much simpler and more charged political conversation. How difficult
will courts make it to even attempt to hold police accountable in cases of
excessive or near fatal uses of force?
Keep in mind that the question does not assume the answer.
Skepticism aside, I do not pretend to know if the officers were justified
in firing on Torres. And as the dissent harshly notes, for Torres to recover
in a federal lawsuit under § 1983 or the Fourteenth Amendment, she
must still clear the disturbingly high “shocks the conscience” standard.46
Additionally, the now infamous qualified immunity doctrine bars
recovery for much police misconduct that falls short of that line. But
on the dissent’s Fourth Amendment view, one would not even have
the opportunity to ask the question. While the majority rebuffs the
suggestion that they are driven by secondary consequences in defining
“seizure,”47 for Torres, the conclusion is critical.
So, this peculiar conversation about whether one is seized by bullets
that do not kill you is a proxy battle for whether citizens can even call the
police to account in such peculiar situations. It invites us to inspect how
we collectively respond to police shooting in their myriad incarnations.
If this circumstance is unlikely to repeat itself often, our response says
much about our default legal instincts in restraining police force and
demanding accountability. If our first instinct is to adopt readings of
the Fourth Amendment that shelter police not from ultimate liability
but from even being inspected, then it is impossible to place faith in the
Supreme Court as an avenue of legal progress on police reform. Protests
in the street are not primarily aimed at the Supreme Court. But surely
the weight of our national police reckoning mattered. In the midst of
generational protests focused on the intersection of police force and race,
a ruling that ignored police bullets because Torres did not die would have
been unbearable.

46
47

Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1003–04 (majority opinion).
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What then to make of this trio of policing cases? Do they gesture
at any sweeping movements in Fourth Amendment law? Even more
politically, do they offer any reform agenda at the Supreme Court level
for those committed to more just, less deadly, and less racist policing
across the country?
I doubt it. But then, I doubt such a thing was possible. Remember
we began with the reminder that the Supreme Court is a poor place to
look for systemic changes of policing, the quintessential local governing
power. Barring a once-in-several-generations makeover, such as the
Warren Court, the Supreme Court can do little more than set national
minimal standards through its Fourth Amendment interpretation.
That is not to say such changes cannot be important. Cutting back on
the staggering deference we pay to extraordinarily aggressive policing
liberties would have real practical effects. As might paring back on
qualified immunity doctrines. Moreover, the symbolic effect of such
signals from the Supreme Court would send ripples across the country.
But the most promising changes to policing will always be fought within
the corners of state constitutions, state capitals, and city halls. Successful
change will require the support of reform-minded police chiefs, mayors,
city councilors, state legislators, and governors in opposition to leaders
who would maintain the status quo.
Still, a progressive optimist might find hope in these three cases.
The cases do not speak with a singular voice restraining police power.
But even those of us with progressive commitments understand that no
collection of nine oracles could sensibly be charged with setting police
policies across the nation. What the cases do, however, is reverberate
some of the most important notes surrounding policing today.
Cooley empowers a vulnerable minority community to police its
boundaries and rejects the idea that privileged non-Indians can behave
with impunity while traveling through reservation lands.
Lange curbs police power to chase people through backyards and
into their homes to enforce the law no matter how minor the legal
infraction. The Court’s language in that case seemingly accepts that
the circumstances where police chase someone for a misdemeanor
without other signs of exigency will be rare. I rather wonder. For many
communities where the enforcement of misdemeanors blurs with the
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imposition of social control, limits on enforcement powers will be
welcome. And for some within those communities and too many outside
of them who view policing as the most-ready mechanism of social
control, Lange may be a reminder that we cannot police our way out of
every minor social problem.
Lastly, shootings as extraordinary as Torres may not occur every day,
but our nation has seen enough of them to weigh on our collective souls.
Particularly, for people of color, the steady rhythm of videos displaying
callous murder after murder of unarmed people of color has become an
undoing experience. If nothing else, Torres holds that such a shooting
cannot be simply ignored, that victims may at least begin the laborious
process of seeking accountability, and that the argument that there is no
Fourth Amendment violation because one survived a volley of uncalledfor police bullets is beyond the constitutional pale.
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